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Abstract
During 2003 there was an immense amount of debate
about the possibility of states adopting extraterritorial ap-
proaches to asylum processing and refugee protection, and
about such policies’ compatibility with international refu-
gee and human rights law. The debate has centred on two
central policy initiatives: the so-called “UK Proposals”
and UNHCR’s “Convention Plus.” It has so far focused
primarily on the practical and legal consequences of these
initiatives. What has been less clear is any explanation of
the UK’s (and other supportive states’) motivation in as-
piring to de-territorialize refugee protection and of
UNHCR’s strategy in the evolving consultations. After
clarifying the conceptual and political relationship be-
tween the two sets of proposals, the article explores the mo-
tivation and international relations underlying them,
from the perspectives of the UK Government and
UNHCR.
Résumé
Dans le courant de l’année 2003, il y a eu beaucoup de
débats sur la possibilité que certains états adoptent des
approches pour le traitement extraterritorial des deman-
des d’asile, ainsi que sur la question de savoir si de telles
politiques seraient compatibles avec le droit international
et les droits humains. Le débat tournait autour de deux
initiatives principales : ce qu’on appelle les « UK Propo-
sals » (‘La proposition britannique’), et Convention Plus
de l’UNHCR. Il a porté jusqu’à présent sur les conséquen-
ces pratiques et légales de ces initiatives. Ce qui n’est tou-
jours pas clair, c’est une explication quelconque des
motivations de la Grande Bretagne (et des autres états so-
lidaires) en voulant déterritorialiser la protection du
droit d’asile, ainsi que la stratégie de l’UNHCR dans les
consultations qui évoluent toujours. Après avoir éclairci
les liens conceptuels et politiques entre les deux séries de
propositions, l’article explore les motifs et les relations in-
ternationales qui les sous-tendent, du point de vue du
gouvernement britannique et de l’UNHCR.
Introduction
T
here has been a great deal of, often conceptually and
terminologically confused, debate about the “new”1
extraterritorial approaches to forced migration.
Throughout 2003 the details of what came to be called the
“UK Proposals” for “transit processing centres” (TPCs) and
“regional processing zones” (RPZs) were gradually leaked
via the press. They became a concern for NGOs in the
context of Home Office policy formation and a subject of
intergovernmental negotiation at the EU level.2 Simultane-
ously, UNHCR began to reveal details of an initiative which
it called “Convention Plus.” This banner, initially proposed
by Ruud  Lubbers in  September  2002,3 was widely  used
during the fifty-third Session of ExCom in October 2002,
before it acquired any substance or detail. At this stage it was
simply associated with ideas of creating a series of special
agreements on the secondary movement of refugees and

asylum seekers and “greater emphasis on ensuring lasting
solutions in regions of origin.”4 It was only in the second half
of 2003, in UNHCR’s public statements surrounding the
EU’s Thessaloniki Summit and the publication of the
Agenda for Protection,5 that the details of Convention Plus
started to become more coherent.
Given the lack of clarity and the drip-fed nature of the
details, it is not surprising that the two approaches were
regarded as synonymous, especially by the UK media. The
Economist, for example, defined Convention Plus as an
“attempt to separate the concept of protecting asylum-seek-
ers, to which the convention binds them [states], from that
of admitting them to the country they want to go to,” a
definition widely regarded by UNHCR as more applicable
to the UK Proposals.6 When this was written in February,
UNHCR had given very little substance to its Convention
Plus; yet the British government sought to align the two
concepts. For example, in the New International Approaches
To Asylum Processing and Protection document distributed
in March, the Home Office attempted to associate its ideas
with UNHCR, arguing that “this new approach draws on
the UNHCR’s plans for modernisation of the international
protection system (Convention Plus)” and that “it would
build on work already underway in UNHCR (Convention
Plus).”7 Meanwhile, UNHCR, having constantly used its
label in forums such as ExCom and the UN Commission
on Human Rights, was forced into a post hoc formulation
of its content. In doing so it distanced itself from aspects of
the UK proposals, constantly making statements about
what Convention Plus is not. It issued guidelines to NGOs,
held a consultation on Convention Plus at the High Com-
missioner’s Forum in June, and gave numerous press brief-
ings clarifying UNHCR’s position.8
Given the manner in which both sets of policy initiative
emerged and evolved during the course of 2003, their de-
tails and relationship to one another require clarification
and explanation. This article, therefore, seeks to explore
two sets of questions. Firstly, what is the conceptual and
political relationship of the UK Proposals and Convention
Plus? Secondly, what are the underlying motives behind
both the UK and UNHCR proposals and their response to
one another?
Extraterritorial “Protection”: Definitions and
Proposals
Given the conceptual confusion, it is important to be clear
from the outset about terminology and the relationship that
the UK Proposals and UNHCR’s Convention Plus have to
one another. Extraterritorial protection9 may be defined as:
the raft of refugee policies initiated by OECD countries
aimed at de-territorializing the provision of protection to
refugees in such a way that temporary protection and the
processing of asylum claims take place outside of the given
nation-state. It can take two distinct forms of policy ap-
proaches: firstly, third-country processing centres and, sec-
ondly, regional protection areas. The former was the central
characteristic of Australia’s “Pacific Solution,”10 while both
aspects (albeit in differing rhetorical form) have at various
stages in the public debate been features of the UK Proposals
and of UNHCR’s Convention Plus.
While UNHCR has attempted to distance itself from the
UK Proposals through numerous policy statements, the UK
initially sought to identify its proposals with the emerging
Convention Plus. Despite differences, the commonalities
between the two sets of proposals have become increasingly
apparent as UNHCR has clarified the substance of Conven-
tion Plus. Unsurprisingly, this has led concerned NGOs,
such as Amnesty International, to identify UNHCR as com-
plicit in promoting the substance of the UK Proposals.11 A
conceptual definition of each form of extraterritorial policy
will be given in turn, distinguishing at the same time be-
tween the UK’s and UNHCR’s position with respect to
each.
Third-Country Processing Centres
Third-country processing centres are centres outside the
recipient state to which spontaneous-arrival asylum seekers
are sent and where they are effectively detained until their
claims are assessed. Upon assessment of the claim, the asy-
lum seekers are either awarded status and returned to the
recipient state (or an alternative safe country) or else de-
ported to their country of origin.12 This is the model that
Australia has used on Nauru and Manus Island, as part of
its Pacific Solution to deal with spontaneous-arrival asylum
seekers. The UK’s proposal explicitly drew its inspiration
from that model and proposed a centre outside the EU’s
external borders to be managed by the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM). It was to be used to screen
applicants from the controversial “white list” of states sus-
pected of having “unfounded claims,” currently already
detained and fast-tracked, for example, in the UK’s Oak-
ington Reception Centre.13 After prior consultation with
members  of  the European Council,14 the UK delegation
proposed this initiative at the EU’s Thessaloniki Summit in
June 2003, where it recommended proceeding with and
extending a pilot project bilaterally agreed with Croatia for
such a centre to be built outside of Zagreb. This proposal
was rejected by Germany and Sweden.15 The premise of this
proposal was that it would be part of an EU burden-sharing
initiative;16 as the Home Office document, New Interna-
tional Approaches, put it, “those granted refugee status
would be resettled within the EU,  on  a  burden-sharing
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basis.”17 The EU rejection, as well as academic and NGO
focus on the proposal’s illegality and non-viability,18 seems
to have caused the UK Government to drop this element of
the policy. Caroline Flint MP said to the House of Lords
Select Committee on EU Affairs (Sub-Committee F) on 29
October, “We are now focusing on the regional protection
elements of our earlier ideas. We are no longer pursuing the
concept of transit processing centres.”19
Although UNHCR  opposed the location of  the  EU’s
TPCs outside EU borders, it launched a counter-initiative
to the UK’s TPC initiative, which at various times has been
explicitly identified with Convention Plus by UNHCR.
Ruud Lubbers, for example, writes:
The UNHCR proposes separating out groups that are misusing
the system, namely asylum-seekers from countries that produce
hardly any refugees. These asylum-seekers would be sent to one
or more reception centres within the EU, where their claims
would be rapidly examined by joint EU teams.20
Given that even the UK proposals were directed at those
from the controversial “white list” of states suspected of
having “unfounded claims,” the divergence between the
two sets of processing-centre proposals is negligible. The
key differences are on legal grounds rather than principle.
The initial UK proposals set out the legal claim that: “The
1951 Refugee Convention obliges states to provide protec-
tion…There is no obligation under the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention to process claims for asylum in the country of
application.”21 Meanwhile, UNHCR appears to confirm
this position, Erika Feller, Director of International Protec-
tion, for example, stating that: “If an individual makes a
claim in your state to your protection and you are a state
party to the Convention it is incumbent on you to ensure
that that person has access to protection, whether it is in
your country or somewhere else”[emphasis added]. How-
ever, she makes the distinction that such a transfer of
responsibility can  only occur  under  limited  conditions.
These apply within the EU, she claims, because, firstly, there
are common directives on human rights that ensure checks
and balances and, secondly, the transfer is “from a unilat-
eral responsibility to a system of common responsibility.”22
Regional Protection Areas
Regional protection areas encompass a broader range of poli-
cies which are ostensibly intended to facilitate the provision
of temporary protection to refugees within their region of
origin, particularly in so-called “first countries of asylum.”
These proposals, although often vague, have covered two
central elements: firstly, the idea of strengthened regional
protection capacity and, secondly, a resettlement program
based on “protected entry procedures.” Both UK and
UNHCR policy show considerable overlap, even consensus,
in these two areas. For example, the UK’s 2002 White Paper,
Secure Borders, Safe Haven, refers to both elements. It wel-
comes the European Commission’s study on the specific
issues of both extending protection to refugees  in their
region of origin and establishing a European-wide resettle-
ment program.23 With respect to regional protection it ar-
gues that: “we must discourage secondary movements by
working internationally for a global system that delivers
protection for those who need it.”24 It explains the outline of
a resettlement policy: “one possibility is for the UK to set a
quota each year working closely with UNHCR to identify
resettlement needs. We would set eligibility criteria to be
used by UNHCR field officers, identifying suitable candi-
dates.”25 Very similar ideas are central to the vision of Con-
vention Plus as laid out in Goal 3 of UNHCR’s Agenda for
Protection.26 This goal is summarized as: the desire “to work
with States, particularly first-asylum States, to develop spe-
cific burden-sharing agreements that would be applied in
response to mass influxes and to resolve protracted refugee
situations.”27 The central objectives of Goal 3 most relevant
to states are those which advocate increased responsibility
sharing with the South (objective 1), improved regional
protection (objective 2), and the use of resettlement as a
burden-sharing tool (objective 6). The similarities and dif-
ferences between the UK and UNHCR approaches to each
of the two areas of “protection in the region” and “protected
entry procedures” can be explored in turn.
1. In terms of “protection in the region,” the key distinc-
tion between the UK and UNHCR policies appears to be
one of emphasis. The UK’s New International Approaches
document puts the accent very much on containment or,
at least, “management” of “flows.” For example, it flagged
this element of the initiatives under the heading “measures
to improve regional management of migration flows” and
emphasized that “improving such protection would not
simply benefit those who currently remain in the region: it
should also reduce the incentive for the minority who do
move on to Europe to do so.”28 Meanwhile, UNHCR has
been keen to place emphasis on protection. Lubbers ex-
plains, for example, “under the ‘regional prong’, the
UNHCR is proposing a more coherent, wide-ranging effort
by donor states to support refugees in the host country.”29
It has acknowledged in the Agenda for Protection, however,
that these regional protection measures “should aim to
reduce the need for asylum seekers and refugees to move
on in an irregular manner by making protection available
and generating solutions.”30
However, UNHCR has been keen to distance itself from
the language if not the substance of the UK’s ideas. It has
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attempted to distance its Convention Plus from many of the
labels associated with the UK proposals. Janowski’s state-
ment, Setting the Record Straight, for example, rejects the
notion of “safe havens” or “zones,” explaining that
UNHCR proposes inter alia “protection of refugees in the
region of origin.”31 Given the observation by Groupe d’In-
formation et de Soutien des Immigrés (GISTI) that the
phrase “regional protection zones” invokes connotations of
historical protection failures such as the Srebrenica massa-
cre32 and Schuster’s intimation that temporary protection
zones might be established “along the lines of Sabra and
Shatila,”33 the  desire for clarity  of  distinction is under-
standable. UNHCR have, however, claimed that the dis-
tinction is more than semantic: Feller points out that the
organization does not support the idea of closed camps but
does support capacity building.34
2. On “protected entry procedures,” there appears to be
an emerging consensus between the UK and UNHCR in the
form of a resettlement scheme. Noll, Fagerlund, and Lie-
baut define protected entry procedures as the diplomatic
representation of a third safe country in the region of origin
allowing non-nationals “to approach  the  potential  host
state outside its territory with a claim for asylum or other
form of international protection” and “to be granted an
entry permit in case of a positive response to that claim.”35
Its precedents are in the Danish visa office in Zagreb during
the Balkan crisis and proposals that were put to the UN
General Assembly by the Danish in 1986 and to the Inter-
governmental Conference on Immigration, Refugee and
Asylum Policy (IGC) by the Dutch in 1993.36 In October the
UK and UNHCR together outlined a pilot resettlement
project agreed with Ghana along the lines of these propos-
als. Under this scheme, 500 UNHCR-nominated refugees,
victims of the Liberian civil war, were to be allowed to come
to the UK.37 Iain Walsh, Deputy Director of the Immigration
and Nationality Directorate, explained that:
The idea is that there will be some refugees in the region, in West
Africa, that UNHCR feel that they will not be able to integrate
into their areas and where return to their own country is not
possible. Between ourselves and UNHCR we have identified a
number of persons who are refugees and whom we think it is
appropriate for them to spend their long-term lives in the UK.38
Beyond the heavy rhetoric and obfuscation that has char-
acterized the debate on extraterritorial protection, it is this
policy area that is most likely to emerge in a practicable
form from the myriad of proposals. If developed beyond
the pilot stage, such initiatives potentially change the basis
on which asylum applications are made from a system of
spontaneous arrival to one of a quota system based on
protection and processing in the region. In this sense, if
third-country processing centres are the Pacific Solution
element of Australia’s asylum policy for dealing with spon-
taneous arrivals, this aspect of the proposals draws upon
the UNHCR quota system by which Australia takes 12,000
refugees per year, particularly via Indonesia.39 It is in many
ways an attempt to return to the quota structure that existed
prior to the growth of South-North spontaneous asylum in
the 1980s and 1990s. Suhrke explains how this kind of
structure facilitated multilateral burden-sharing arrange-
ments for post-World War II resettlement and Vietnamese
resettlement after 1975.40 The UK-UNHCR pilot implies
that a similar structure may ultimately be adapted to couple
protected entry procedures with an EU or a global burden-
sharing system.
Exploring the Motives behind the Policies
In examining ways of reconciling individual rights with state
interests, the title of this special issue implicitly highlights a
dichotomy common to many contemporary international
relations debates: that between state security and human
security. That these concepts are often in contradiction was
the central premise of the critical security studies project that
emerged as a post-Cold War challenge to the state-centric
conceptions of security implicit to neo-realist approaches.
By focusing on this tension, critical approaches to security
have sought to show how, why, and for whom the “national
interest” is constructed41 and how it often threatens human
security both within and outside the state.42
In the case of extraterritorial protection policies, there
has already been extensive work, by both academics and
human rights groups,43 demonstrating how such policies
may threaten the human security of refugees. Noll’s work,
for example, and its use by Amnesty International in their
paper Unlawful and Unworkable, highlights the historical
human rights consequences of the precedents for third-
country processing centres and of the use of concepts such
as “safe havens” and containment. It also demonstrates the
potential illegalities and impracticalities. What has been less
clearly examined is the other side of the critical security
studies dichotomy: the motivation behind state advocacy
of such policies and the implications that this has for the
actions of international organizations. In other words, what
is it that has led the UK to identify these approaches as
serving their “national interests” and why has UNHCR seen
it necessary to adapt to the calls of states for such extrater-
ritorial initiatives? As Eve Lester, Refugee Coordinator of
Amnesty International, suggests:
We have to look at the underlying motives of creating these
mechanisms where people are transferred to extraterritorial
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processing centres or to closed reception centres and consider
whether they are designed to provide comparable protection or
whether they are designed to provide something less than that.44
This is a difficult and inevitably exploratory task but it is
worthwhile because an understanding of such underlying
motives may be the first stage in challenging or re-aligning
them if they are regarded as a threat to human rights. The
motives of the UK and UNHCR will be explored in turn.
The UK Perspective
Understanding and theorizing about the behaviour of states
is conventionally the central preoccupation of international
relations (IR) theory. Neo-realists have tried to explain the
“national interest” in terms of instrumental rational choice,
neo-liberal institutionalists in terms of the interaction of
norms and interests, constructivists in terms of the social
construction of norms and expectations, Marxists in terms
of materialism, critical theorists in terms of elites and power
relations, and post-structuralists in terms of  discourse.45
Except at the epistemological extremes, none of these need
be mutually exclusive: all offer a partial explanation of inter-
national politics.46
Although both Steiner and Loescher are right to lament
the lack of attention paid to the politics of refugee protec-
tion by international relations, a growing body of theory
has attempted to conceptualize the motives that lie behind
states’ provision of refugee protection and its policy formu-
lation.47 This has implicitly or explicitly drawn upon many
of the assumptions of IR theory. For example, Shacknove
has examined the ways in which U.S. provision of asylum
serves “national interest” through its concern for political
stability, economic stability, and foreign policy concerns.48
Loescher’s early work on refugees and security analyzed the
way in which recipient states often derived positive benefit
from the provision of asylum during the East-West migra-
tory context of the Cold War because of its symbolic use.49
Meanwhile, in the post-Cold War era of predominantly
South-North forced migration, Loescher argues that, with-
out the past strategic interests of the Cold War, “refugees
were perceived increasingly as burdens, particularly if they
made a claim for asylum in the West.”50 However, as Steiner
suggests, this approach hardly explains why states continue
to provide asylum or why they choose the specific policies
that they do.51
This has, however, begun to change. Steiner has shown,
by looking at political debate on asylum in Germany, Swit-
zerland, and the UK, how policy has been formed through
a trade-off between “national interests” in terms of, for
example, “internal harmony” and “effective governance”
working in favour of restrictionism on the one hand and
normative and ethical concerns maintaining the basis of the
asylum system on the other.52 In the context of the EU
burden-sharing debate, Thielemann has looked at the dy-
namics by which institutional and legal norms and the
interests of political actors shaped the motives behind bur-
den sharing.53 Meanwhile, the present author has looked at
the benefits states derive from different types of refugee
protection, both independently and as an international
public good, by upholding a regime structure from which
they derive security.54
These broadly theoretical approaches cannot by them-
selves explain the motives behind a specific policy shift such
as New Labour’s seemingly dramatic move towards advo-
cating extraterritorial approaches to asylum. In looking at
the formulation of public policy on asylum and migration
in Germany and the UK, Boswell identifies factors that
explain the formulation of policy over time: how refugees
are constructed in public discourse, the international con-
text, the perceptions and interests of the electorate, and the
constraint of “embedded liberalism.”55 Indeed this provides
a useful starting point for assessing public policy evolution.
Assessment of New Labour’s asylum and immigration
policy is no easy task and is, necessarily, speculative in part.
Flynn recently tried to explain the contradiction between
the Government’s increasingly liberal “economic migra-
tion” policy and its increasingly restrictionist asylum policy
by arguing that New Labour’s approach to asylum and
migration is motivated by a utilitarian logic which attempts
to act almost exclusively in favour of economic perform-
ance.56 In response  others have suggested that this is a
massive over-simplification and have pointed to factors
such as the party’s search for a “silver bullet” to “solve” the
asylum “problem” through increasingly radical solutions.57
Whatever explanation one provides for Government pol-
icy, short-term political and institutional responses to man-
aging media responses will inevitably play a part. However,
Schuster rightly warns, “One should be wary of charac-
terising this process as a completely ad hoc response to
events.”58 In reality, policy explanations will lie somewhere
between monocausal metatheories and regarding policies
as simply cyclical and ad hoc institutional reflexes.
It is with this in mind that this section attempts to explain
the changes underlying the Government’s perception of the
asylum “problem” across four areas: economic cost, social
cost, political cost, and international context. These catego-
ries overlap to a great extent with the central elements of
policy input identified by Shacknove and Boswell, and
build upon the theoretical model outlined by the present
author in a UNHCR Working Paper.59 Within each of these
exploratory categories, the interaction between public, me-
dia, and political perception will be explored, questioning
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whether the construction of these “costs” provides a “logic”
for extraterritorial protection.
Economic cost
Noll reflects on the relationship between economic cost and
extraterritorial protection and identifies something of a
quandary. In examining the UK proposals for third-country
processing centres in the light of empirical evidence from
Australia’s Pacific Solution, he argues that, far from reduc-
ing asylum costs, extraterritorial processing is vastly more
expensive than the domestic processing of spontaneous ar-
rivals, and that it is without any significant deterrent effect.60
This is indeed a paradox.
On the one hand, the UK proposals have arisen in the
context of a national debate that has appeared to privilege,
and even fetichize, the “cost” and “inefficiencies” of the
current system. A series of recent headlines is testimony to
this obsession: “Asylum Cost under Fire” (BBC), “Asylum
Error to Cost UK Millions” (Guardian), “Letwin: Asylum
Cuts Will Fund Policing” (Guardian), “Asylum Seeker Dis-
persal ‘A Waste of Money’” (Guardian), “Asylum Cost Hits
Eurotunnel” (Telegraph).61 Similarly, one of the explicit
motivating factors behind the Government’s extraterrito-
rial approaches has been the allocation of resources.
Caroline Flint MP has referred to the “imbalance” between
UNHCR’s US$900 million annual budget to provide pro-
tection to 12 million refugees and 5 million IDPs compared
with the US$10 billion spent by just fifteen Western states
on providing asylum for 500,000 asylum seekers.62
On the other hand, the “UK proposals” explicitly draw
their inspiration from the Australian model, for which there
is conclusive evidence that it raises the financial costs of
processing asylum claims. For example, the majority of the
AUD$1.2 billionrefugee budget increase in 2002–03 has been
allocated to offshore processing, with $430 million being
allocated to processing in third countries in the Pacific (cur-
rently Nauru and Manus Island) and $455 million on proc-
essing in Australian offshore locations (such as Christmas
Island and the Cocos Islands) over the period 2002–03 to
2005–06. A further $219 million was allocated for the con-
struction of the facilities and $75 million for transit costs.63
In terms of the comparative efficiency of domestic and off-
shore processing, the average cost to the taxpayer of offshore
processing was $293 per day on Christmas Island and $236
on the Cocos Islands, against $87 per day at Port Hedland,
$65 per day in Sydney, and $102 per day at Woomera, for
example.64 Similarly, the Refugee Council, basing its conclu-
sion on the UK’s recent expenditure on forcible removals,
estimates that the transport costs alone of proceeding with its
extraterritorial proposals would require an increase of £1.5
billion in asylum expenditure.65
Similarly, with respect to regional protection areas, the
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (IPLA) claims,
“Even if there is a political imperative to reduce costs in
relation to asylum, it is IPLA’s view that the proposals for
RPZs are unlikely  to make any costs savings at all and
indeed are likely to be cost intensive.” The primary expla-
nation they offer for this is, firstly, that constructing such
an approach will require an additional layer of bureaucracy
and, secondly, that it will create costs associated with iden-
tifying and returning asylum seekers to, say, an African
refugee camp.66 The former explanation is clearly true as it
will, particularly in the initial stages, require massive coor-
dination between the host state, the UK, and UNHCR (and
any other agencies involved). The latter reason depends
very much on how the scheme is implemented. However,
given that the deterrent effect of protected entry procedures
relies very much on “successfully” dismantling alternative
routes to spontaneous asylum67 and that deportation costs
have already proved very high under the status quo,68 the
prospects of cost-saving seem extremely limited.
Social and political cost
The perceived cost of hosting asylum seekers domestically is
more than merely financial. Government policy will also be
influenced by perceptions of social and political cost. The
shift towards extraterritorial approaches is most appropri-
ately seen as a continuation of the way in which the Govern-
ment has sought to define and manage the “problem” of
asylum since the massive growth in numbers of spontane-
ous-arrival asylum seekers from the South at the end of the
1980s and during the early 1990s. Since 1993, when the first
piece of legislation exclusively aimed at asylum was intro-
duced, the Government, rather than challenging media por-
trayals of refugees as a threat to the welfare state, national
identity, and social cohesion, has sought policies that implic-
itly reify refugees as a “burden” by attempting to reallocate
(or shift) that “burden.” Indeed, Robinson’s work on the
“burden-sharing” debate in the UK can be usefully extended
to understand the logic behind extraterritoriality.69
Until the late 1990s the overwhelming majority of asy-
lum seekers and refugees were spatially concentrated in
London and the South East.70 This created what Robinson
calls “sites of struggle” such as Dover and a number of
London boroughs, where local media framing and hence
public perceptions of rising economic costs created high
levels of tension and violent clashes between local people
and asylum seekers. With over 80 per cent of asylum seekers
concentrated in the southeast, the Government began its
policy of dispersal, formalized in the 1999 Asylum and
Immigration Act, through which it established ten regional
consortia to which asylum seekers were sent.71 As Boswell
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explains, dispersal aimed not only to redistribute financial
costs, but also to reduce the social tensions arising from
local concentration by physical transfer of the “burden.”72
The problem according to Boswell, however, was that far
from reducing social tension, dispersal exacerbated inter-
ethnic tensions because of the way in which it was carried
out: many of the selected “cluster areas” were poorly chosen
and often had already-resident ethnic minority groups; the
new influx triggered significant inter-ethnic tensions in-
volving not only the asylum seekers but also the local ethnic
minority residents. She gives the example of Hull where,
following the dispersal of 1,000 asylum seekers in spring
2001, there was a significant increase in racist attacks.73
Similarly, in Glasgow, tension on the Sighthill Estate ulti-
mately led to the murder of a Kosovar asylum seeker.74
These incidents achieved massive media attention which
discredited the dispersal policy. That the “cluster areas”
were ill-chosen is illustrated by the correlation between the
areas chosen and the subsequent successes of the British
National Party (BNP) in local elections: of the eighteen
council seats won by the party by September 2003, half had
been areas of the dispersal scheme: five in Burnley, two in
Sandwell, one in Kirklees, and one in Stoke-on-Trent.75 In
areas of inter-ethnic tensions the BNP was able to play the
anti-asylum card with slogans such as: “While the dumping
of asylum-seekers on our communities is fundamentally
the fault of the Government, BNP Councillors will do
everything in their power to prevent asylum-seekers being
dumped in our areas.”76
Rather than challenge directly the construction of this
“problem” by the extreme right and the media, the Govern-
ment’s response has been to accept the problem on these
terms. It is in this context that the narrowing of physical
space available to asylum seekers has been foreclosed. Ro-
binson explains, drawing on Sibley, how “societies purify
space by identifying ‘residues’ – the wrong things in the
wrong place – and by eliminating them, or else moving
them elsewhere. The nation state is one of the key actors in
such spatial exclusion because it values conformity and
social control.” He argues that through media portrayal of
asylum seekers the physical space available for the domestic
provision of refuge has been eroded.77
Further exemplification may be drawn from the public
response to post-dispersal policies such as the attempts to
establish large-scale reception centres along the lines of
those commonly found in continental Europe. Attempts to
transform an Ministry of Defence site in Bicester into a
reception centre for 750 asylum seekers have been scup-
pered by the challenge of the Bicester Action Group, which
has gained widespread national support and extended its
campaign to oppose all rural asylum centres.78 Similarly, on
the outskirts of Newport in south Wales, the rural commu-
nity of Langstone has formed Langstone Action and has
mobilized to prevent a reception facility being established
in the village. The link between media influence and fear is
evident in comments by local residents, such as:
I am not prejudiced, by any stretch of the imagination, but you
have only got to read in the papers what’s happening with asylum-
seekers and it does make you worry. It is fear of the unknown. A
lot of mums are worried about strangers not from the area hanging
around. People are concerned about house prices.79
Such reactions, unchallenged by the Government, clearly
limit the physical space that it is politically acceptable and
electorally desirable for MPs to allocate to asylum seekers.
Instead they have meant that within the context of asylum
policy, political capital is more easily gained by “playing the
numbers game.” Alarmist and exclusionary statements
have become increasingly commonplace. For example,
Chris Mullin MP, Chair of the House of Commons Home
Affairs Select Committee, declared the figure of 110,700
asylum seekers entering the UK in 2002 was “unsustain-
able” and gave the following catalogue of “inevitable” con-
sequences:
If allowed to continue unchecked, it could overwhelm the ca-
pacity of the receiving countries to cope, leading inevitably to
social unrest. It could also, and there are signs this may already
be happening, lead to a growing political backlash, which will
in turn lead to the election of extremist parties and extremist
solutions.80
That “physical presence” has, within the discourse, been
constructed as the “problem” is evident by the Government’s
“fetichization” of numerical targets for “asylum cuts”: in
October 2002, David Blunkett set “targets” for halving the
number of asylum applicants from a baseline of 8,900 claims
per month to 4,450 by September 2003. By August 2003, with
a reduction to 5,000 per month, he was able to proclaim “the
kind of progress we have made is already a matter for cele-
bration.”81 This was achieved through measures such as the
closure of Sangatte, the imposition of visa restrictions on
Zimbabwe, and extending the white list to a further seventeen
states.82 The “numbers game” is a direct consequence of
increased identification of the “asylum burden” not with
economic cost but with physical presence. In February, Tony
Blair argued, “In the end the only way of dealing with this is
to stop the numbers coming in. Once people get in, unless
you can discover what country they have come from and get
that country to agree to take them back, then it is extremely
difficult to get them back.”83
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Linked to this is the political desire for control. As Schus-
ter argues, the driving force behind UK asylum policy is
“the need for control, to assert the sovereign power of the
state and to ensure its stability by legitimating that con-
trol.”84 Government discourse has been filled with such
references. For example, in the foreword to the 2002 White
Paper, the Home Secretary refers to the need for “trust” and
“integrity.”85 The need for “end-to-end credibility” is ex-
plicitly given as an underlying motive behind the proposals
for a resettlement program in the Executive Summary.86
Meanwhile, the New International Approaches document
gives falling public support for the status quo as one of its
justifications for the “new” approaches.87
It seems evident that the Government believes reasser-
tion of control would restore public credibility. Blunkett
says, “ I believe that men and women of this country will
welcome those from across the world if they know what we
are doing is trusted, and they can be confident in its admini-
stration.”88 The Australian  precedent for extraterritorial
protection offers evidence of how a qualitative distinction
can be created between two sets of asylum seekers. There,
the 12,000 quota refugees are seen as qualitatively different
from the “queue jumpers” or spontaneous arrivals, who are
regarded as pariahs.89 In the aftermath of September 11,
high-profile media stories mean that spontaneous-arrival
asylum seekers have been increasingly identified as a secu-
rity threat. Reports about the discovery of ricin in a flat in
London occupied by asylum seekers90 and the use of the
system by former members of the Taliban,91 for example,
create popular demand for “control” that can be met by a
policy that externalizes the processing structure. In this
context, the Government may believe that a public percep-
tion of increased control can be attained through the type
of qualitative distinction drawn in Australia – between
“threatening” spontaneous arrivals, on the one hand, and
the externally vetted quota refugees on the other.
The International Context
Equally important to the UK Government is the imperative
to work broadly within the constraints of international
norms. Steiner’s analysis of the role of legal norms and ethical
concerns, grounded in liberalism and Judeo-Christian heri-
tage,92 Boswell’s analysis of the “constraints of ‘embedded
liberalism’,”93 and the work on the role of norms94 all imply
that the international legal framework and, in particular, the
1951 Convention  provide a regime structure that liberal
democratic states are extremely reluctant to abandon. This is
both because it forms part of their very identity as liberal
democratic states, and at the same time upholds the collective
action that underpins this regime structure and so provides
collective (public good) security benefits.
The importance of these normative constraints in re-
stricting the extent to which the UK has been prepared to
pursue its extraterritorial initiatives unilaterally is reveal-
ing. The UK has attempted to work with UNHCR to nego-
tiate its extraterritorial policies rather than abandon
UNHCR involvement. It is notable that in the end the only
emerging pilot project is the result of a joint UK-UNHCR
initiative. Meanwhile, the UK has attempted to justify
(rightly or wrongly) the legality of its proposals through
reference to the 1951 Convention – implying that it still
regards this as the basis of refugee protection.
Similarly, within the EU context, the Government’s
abandonment of the TPC proposals after their rejection by
Sweden and Germany at Thessaloniki shows how the nor-
mative structures (and issue-linkages existing within the
EU) restricted the potential for the kind of unilateralism
available to the Australian and U.S. governments in estab-
lishing their third-country processing centres. This contrast
highlights the fact that the norms and ethics of some EU
states may positively constrain the initiatives by other
member states to place restrictions on asylum provision.
UNHCR: Between Catalyst and Barometer
It is extremely difficult to infer precisely what kind of diplo-
matic dialogue has taken place between UNHCR and the UK
Government over extraterritorial protection. What is clear,
however, is that dialogue has taken place both as part of
UNHCR’s Global Consultations and more specifically in
relation to the UK proposals and Convention Plus. UNHCR
is necessarily in a difficult position: on the one hand it is an
intergovernmental organization representing its member
states and reliant upon their voluntary donations; on the
other, it holds a mandate to uphold the 1951 Convention
and provide protection to refugees. Where these dual im-
peratives come into conflict, as they increasingly do,
UNHCR must find a strategic balance between the role as a
barometer of state policy and that of catalyst for constructive
influence on state policy, trying to lead and ensure refugee
protection without alienating major donors.
Loescher explains how the emergence of South-North
“jet-age” refugees and the ensuing unwillingness of states
to admit refugees has brought UNHCR into conflict with
states, in such a way that it has “ultimately lost the fight to
maintain its position as the principal source of legitimacy
and influence over refugee and asylum policy in Europe.”
He argues that this increasingly forced Sadako Ogata as UN
High Commissioner for Refugees to frame policies in terms
of state interests.95 Chimni further argues that, as an inter-
national organization, UNHCR relies upon the interests of
a small coalition of hegemonic Northern states and that it
“survives only if it continues to serve these interests.” He
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suggests, for example, that during the 1990s UNHCR has
“gone along with” initiatives such as “safe havens” and
“safety zones” and has “sought to operationalize the con-
tainment of powerful donor countries” as a consequence of
donor dependency.96 Meanwhile, Barutciski argues that, in
the case of Bosnia, UNHCR was “subverted” to fulfill the
containment aims of the EU states with its “safe havens”
fulfilling the political objectives of its major donors.97
Dubernet, too, demonstrates how, in the case of Iraq, So-
malia, and Bosnia,  protection of IDPs administered by
UNHCR (among others) was a tool of containment that
failed to serve the human security interests of those dis-
placed.98 The present author has shown the empirical link
between earmarked donations to UNHCR, based on state
interests in containment, and the activities of UNHCR.99
Loescher, however, is marginally more optimistic about
the role of UNHCR. He argues, “States remain the pre-
dominant actors. But this does not mean that international
organizations like the UNHCR are completely without
power or influence;” and “UNHCR has not solely been an
instrument of state interests.” For him, although state in-
terests are the dominant factor, UNHCR has played a subtle
role of “persuasion and socialisation.”100 So, in the context
of the extraterritorial protection debate, how has UNHCR
balanced the roles of barometer and catalyst?
UNHCR is aware that Northern states have concerns
about asylum. Lubbers acknowledges, “There are genuine
concerns about the way the system is being managed, about
the  role  of smugglers  and about those who  misuse the
system by falsely portraying themselves as asylum seek-
ers.”101 Meanwhile, the Agenda for Protection acknowledges
that an element of the motivation behind strengthening
protection capacities should “aim to reduce the need for
asylum-seekers and refugees to move on in an irregular
movement by making protection available and generate
solutions.”102 It is the use of words such as “irregular” to
describe spontaneous arrivals, with its implication that re-
gional protection and spontaneous asylum are mutually
exclusive and its reinforcement of the logic of containment,
that is likely to worry those who fear the Agenda is an
attempt to pander to exclusion. This is exactly what
UNHCR must avoid if it is to avert the disasters that came
from containment in the 1990s.
The concern that UNHCR has been a passive barometer
of UK interests throughout the debate has been put by
Amnesty International. For example, Eve Lester, in discuss-
ing the proposal for third-country processing centres, said,
“I know that the UNHCR position is quite compliant,”
impelling UNHCR to a better fulfillment of its obligations
under Article 35 of the Convention to supervise state com-
pliance with the Convention.103 Amnesty’s Unlawful and
Unworkable was particularly concerned with the extent to
which UNHCR’s “counter-proposal” replicated many of
the problems of the UK proposals,104 for example, oversim-
plifying the review procedure and undermining judicial
supervision. The report also expressed alarm at the UK’s
overt statement in its New Vision paper that it hoped to use
Convention Plus to turn UNHCR “into the organisation we
would wish it to be.”105
Convention Plus appears to represent a compromise of
UNHCR’s mandate in order to meet the interests of restric-
tionism, though, an alternative way of reading it is that
UNHCR is adapting to the realpolitik of state demands in
order to influence them and fulfill its mandate subject to
these constraints. The two key components of its mandate
are to uphold the Convention and to ensure protection to
its “population of concern” (predominantly refugees and
IDPs in the South). On the first component, it would be
easy to read Convention Plus as a dilution of the original
Convention when faced with statements such as, “The 1951
Refugee Convention remains the cornerstone of the inter-
national refugee protection regime, yet it alone does not
suffice. The Agenda for Protection is thus about building on
the Convention. I call this the ‘Convention Plus’ ap-
proach.”106 Yet, it could equally be interpreted as adaptation
to ensure that states remain within the broad framework of
the regime. Indeed, if any aspect of the debate has been
encouraging, it has been the extent to which the UK, in spite
of its proposals, has appeared willing to remain within the
structure and has adapted its policies as a result of debate
over the legality of its proposals under the Convention. On
the second component of its mandate, UNHCR has man-
aged, in part, to shift the debate away from simply process-
ing towards protection in the region. If it can successfully
direct states towards improved responsibility sharing with
the South, then it may increase both voluntary donations
and protection capacity.
Indeed UNHCR has not been passive in its relationship
to the UK proposals, but has succeeded in contesting, and
influencing, the UK. Erika Feller’s words are indicative:
We do not like Regional Protection Areas. We have said it very
clearly. What we do like, and I think this is something that one
has to give a lot of credit to the UK for, is the innovation it has
created towards improving protection in the region of origin.107
It shows how, once UNHCR improved its initially disas-
trous public relations campaign and clarified Convention
Plus, it was able to engage constructively with the common-
alities and differences between the two sets of proposals. It
is unclear how much influence UNHCR has had on the UK;
its abandonment of the transit processing centres, for ex-
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ample, may owe more to EU rejection in Thessaloniki than
UNHCR diplomacy. However, whatever arguments one
might make about its counter-proposal and Convention
Plus, it is clear that it has not been a passive agent or tool of
the UK  or of the partner countries (Denmark  and the
Netherlands) that backed the UK’s proposals. This augurs
well, though, only if UNHCR can maintain this influence
and avoid being used as a tool of containment as it has been
in the past.
Conclusion
The relationship between the UK proposals and UNHCR’s
Convention Plus is a complex one, both conceptually and
politically. In both cases, the substance of the proposals has
been  clouded by obfuscation and poor public relations.
However, by the end of 2003, the abandonment of the UK’s
proposal for transit processing centres on the EU borders
means that the debate centres upon the future prospects for
regional protection areas. In particular, the UK and UNHCR
appear to be moving towards a resettlement policy based on
“protected entry procedures.” Although the rhetorical em-
phasis of UNHCR has been mainly on protection and that
of the UK mainly on containment and processing, they have
reached sufficient consensus to initiate a pilot project for
refugees from Liberia.
Two major concerns stem from the direction  of the
debate: firstly, what impact it will have on spontaneous-ar-
rival asylum, which remains an important channel for
many people fleeing human rights abuses; secondly,
whether it will be a reversion to the containment strategies
of the 1990s, when UNHCR became a tool for its main
donor states’ policies of exclusion. A tentative identification
of the motives underlying the proposals made by both the
UK Government and UNHCR provides a starting point for
understanding possible methods of contestation that may
contribute to avoiding these risks.
The UK’s proposals stem, not merely from an identifica-
tion of asylum seekers with economic cost, but from the
nexus of social  and political  costs  associated with their
physical presence and the diminishing availability of space
in which they can be accommodated in a way that is politi-
cally sustainable. Since the massive increase in South-North
asylum movement, the UK Government has been trying to
shift the burden of asylum domestically in the way that it
has seen to be the least electorally damaging (or most
electorally enhancing). However, the successive failures of
both dispersal and of rural reception centres and the emerg-
ing media-state securitization of the post-9/11 spontane-
ous-asylum “threat” have all removed the “space” available
for asylum, leaving extraterritorial burden shifting as
amongst the only politically “feasible” strategies. As Robin-
son points out, however, this is not an inevitable repre-
sentation; it emerges from an elite media-political nexus
that encourage this particular definition of the “problem.”
As he suggests, this can most appropriately be contested by
reconceptualizing the “problem,” re-legitimating asylum
seekers, changing the tone of national debate, managing the
media, and changing public perception through, for exam-
ple, education and community involvement.108
UNHCR, meanwhile, has been faced with the uneasy bal-
ancing act of recognizing these state interests and working
within their parameters, on the one hand, and challenging
them on the other. The debateover extraterritorial protection
is unlikely to be the last time it is faced with the need to make
strategic  decisions over whether its mandate  is best met
through innovation, adaptation and compromise, or advo-
cacy of elements of the status quo. Although the details of its
consultations with the UK have not been made public, it has
successfully managed to shift much of the debate from proc-
essing and containment to protection. Whether this is rhe-
torical or substantive,  only time will tell. However, the
willingness of the UK to couch all its proposals in relation to
the Convention and to negotiate with UNHCR imply that
UNHCR continues to maintain its legitimacy and construc-
tive influence on the policy of individual states.
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